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Market definition is essential to merger analysis. Because no standard approach to market definition
exists, opposing parties in antitrust cases often disagree about the extent of the market. These differences
have been particularly relevant in the hospital industry, where the courts have denied seven of eight
merger challenges since 1994, due largely to disagreements over geographic market definition. We
compare geographic markets produced using common ad hoc methodologies to a method that directly
applies the “SSNIP test” to hospitals in California using a structural model. Our results suggest that
previously employed methods overstate hospital demand elasticities by a factor of 2.4 to 3.4 and define
larger markets than would be implied by the merger guidelines’s hypothetical monopolist test. The
use of these methods in differentiated product industries may lead to mistaken geographic market delineation,
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Introduction 
Market definition is pivotal to the antitrust process and a key part of merger 
analysis (Baker, 2007).  The assessment of the potential competitive effects of a merger 
or acquisition rest so heavily on the definition of a relevant antitrust market that Robert 
Pitofsky, the former chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), noted that 
“antitrust practitioners have long known that the most important single issue in most 
enforcement actions—because so much depends on it—is market definition.” (Pitofsky, 
1990, p. 1807).  While there is an approximate consensus about how market definition 
should be done in principle (Baker, 2007), there is wide variation in how it is 
implemented in practice.  A number of ad hoc methods have been used which, as we 
show, do not correspond well to the agreed upon concept of an antitrust market.  
Although these ad hoc methods have been widely criticized, to our knowledge they have 
not been previously compared to empirical antitrust markets that are consistent with 
economic theory.   
It is clear that an antitrust market should be the set of products and locations that 
exercise a significant competitive constraint on each other (Motta, 2004).  The U.S. 
antitrust authorities introduced the “SSNIP” test as a method for delineating markets 
(Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, 1982), and this approach has 
been adopted by competition authorities worldwide.  The Small but Significant and Non-
transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test begins by defining a narrow market and asking 
whether a hypothetical monopolist in the defined market could profitably implement a 
SSNIP (usually a 5 percent price increase for 1 year).  If sufficient numbers of consumers 
are likely to switch to alternative products so as to make the price increase unprofitable,   2
then the firm or cartel lacks the power to raise price. The relevant market therefore needs 
to be expanded. The next closest substitute is added and the process is repeated until the 
point is reached where a hypothetical cartel or monopolist could profitably impose a 5% 
price increase. The set of products/locations so defined constitutes the relevant market. 
While the conceptual exercise prescribed by the SSNIP is straightforward, 
implementation in practice is not.  This is in part due to data limitations, and in part due 
to analysts’ failure to utilize econometric analysis.  If one has reliable estimates of 
demand in hand, the SSNIP test can be implemented in a clear-cut way that is consistent 
with the conceptual exercise.  In the past, data limitations precluded demand estimation.  
In addition, modern econometric methods were not brought to antitrust until 
approximately 20 years ago (Scheffman and Spiller, 1987).  As a consequence, ad hoc 
methods of market definition were developed that did not require either extensive data or 
econometric methods (Elzinga and Hogarty, 1973, 1978; Harris and Simons, 1989).   
These simple quantitative approaches to market definition have been widely used 
in antitrust analysis, yet have been criticized for their static nature, simplifying 
assumptions and internal inconsistencies that have the potential to affect the conclusions 
drawn from the use of these methods (Baker, 2007; Capps et al., 2002; Danger and Frech, 
2001; Frech et al., 2004; Katz and Shapiro, 2003; Langenfeld and Li, 2001; Varkevisser 
et al., 2008; Werden, 1981, 1990).   
  The use of such ad hoc market definition methods has been particularly influential 
for antitrust decisions in the hospital industry, where 1,425 mergers and acquisitions were 
successfully consummated between 1994 and 2009.
1 These mergers have resulted in 
                                                 
1 Kaiser Family Foundation http://www.kff.org/insurance/7031/print-sec5.cfm (accessed July 16, 2010) and 
“Deals and Dealmakers: The Health Care M&A Year in Review” Norwalk, CT: Irving Levin Associates,   3
increases in the price of inpatient care (Keeler et al., 1999; Vita and Sacher, 2001; Capps 
et al., 2003; Gaynor & Vogt, 2003; Dafny, 2009), no measurable increase in the quality 
of care (Hamilton and Ho, 2000)
2 and an estimated loss of $42 billion in consumer 
welfare (Town et al., 2005).
3  While the hospital industry has seen more merger litigation 
in recent years than any other industry,
4 the courts have denied all but one government 
request to block hospital mergers since 1994,
5 due largely to the inability of the antitrust 
authorities to convincingly define a geographic market that supports their case.
6  In the 
eight cases brought to the courts since 1994, the primary reason given for denying the 
government’s request in six of these cases centered on the markets delineation.
7 
This paper introduces a new method for market definition using a fully specified 
structural model of consumer demand and firm behavior. The exercise prescribed by the 
SSNIP can be performed exactly by using such a model.  The use of these models has 
                                                                                                                                                 
Inc., 15
th Edition, 2010, 14
th Edition, 2009, 13
th Edition, 2008, 12
th Edition, 2007, 
http://www.levinassociates.com/compallconfirm?sid=6050 (accessed July 16, 2010). 
2 The Federal Trade Commission produced evidence in the Evanston Northwestern case that a hospital 
merger had led to increased prices without any corresponding increase in quality (see Majoras, 2007).  
3 See Town and Vogt (2006) for a recent survey on the effects of hospital consolidation. 
4 Health Care Mergers and Acquisitions Handbook, Section of Antitrust Law (American Bar Association, 
2003) p. 1 
5 Evanston Northwestern Healthcare was decided in favor of the FTC in 2007. This case marked the first 
time the FTC retrospectively challenged a fully consummated hospital merger .Although the case was 
decided in favor of the FTC, no divestiture was mandated for the merging parties.  
6 Product market definition has not been an issue in hospital merger cases, therefore all of the attention has 
been focused on geographic markets. 
7 The eight cases brought since 1994 are Ukiah [In re Adventist Health System/West and Ukiah Adventist 
Hospital, 117 F.T.C. 224 (1994)], Joplin [FTC v. Freeman Hospital (1995, 911 F. Supp. 1213)], Dubuque 
[United States of America v. Mercy Health Services and Finley Tri-States Health Group, Inc., 902 F.Supp. 
968 (1995)], Grand Rapids [Federal Trade Commission v. Butterworth Health Corporation and Blodgett 
Memorial Medical Center, 946 F. Supp. 1285 (1996)], Long Island [United States of America v. Long 
Island Jewish Medical Center and North Shore Health System, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 121 (1997)], Poplar Bluff 
[Federal Trade Commission v. Tenet Healthcare Corporation, 17 F. Supp. 2d 937 (1998)], Sutter 
[California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd mem., 2000-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) U 
87,665 (9th Cir. 2000), revised, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2001)] and Evanston [In the Matter of 
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation and ENH Medical Group, Inc., 
Initial Decision, Oct. 20, 2005, Docket No. 9315, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/ 
051020initialdecision.pdf.]. All but U.S. v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr and Evanston Northwestern 
Health Care were lost due to failure to define a geographic market. Also, one of the cases was brought by 
state antitrust enforcers without either Agency's involvement. See Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057.   4
been promoted in the past decade as a theoretically superior approach to merger analysis 
in differentiated product industries, (e.g., Motta, 2004; Baker, 2007; Geroski and Griffith, 
2004; van Reenen, 2004; Ivaldi and Lőrincz, 2009) however, such an approach has not 
been commonly employed in antitrust analysis. Consequently little is known about the 
differences in markets produced by these methods relative to methods used in actual 
cases. We apply this method to the hospital industry and compare the markets implied by 
this model to those produced by the ad hoc techniques that have been used in hospital 
merger cases. We seek to better understand the extent to which currently employed 
methods of market definition define markets that are consistent with the criteria for 
merger analysis described in the merger guidelines. 
Our results suggest that the market definition techniques that have been used in 
antitrust enforcement of hospital mergers by and large incorrectly define (geographic) 
markets as specified by the merger guidelines’ hypothetical monopolist test. Our analysis 
of a large subset of hospitals in the state of California using 1995 data suggests that 
markets implied by previously employed quantitative market definition methods are, in 
the majority of cases, substantially larger than those that would be implied by a method 
rooted in the principles set forth in the merger guidelines. Finally, our examination of 
mergers in San Diego provides an illustration of the differences in implied market 
concentration in a localized region of the state, and enables comparison of our approach 
to an alternative market definition method for hospitals developed by Capps et al. (2003). 
Our paper proceeds as follows.  Part I provides background on the merger 
guidelines and their application in the hospital industry.  Part II discusses quantitative 
approaches to market definition.   Part III outlines our use of a structural model to define   5
geographic markets.  Part IV details the simulation methods used for our comparison 
methodologies, while Part V describes our data.  Part VI presents our main results. Part 
VII concludes.  
 
I. The Merger Guidelines and Market Definition 
 The Merger Guidelines   
  The merger guidelines are a collaborative effort by the FTC and DOJ outlining 
the enforcement policy of the agencies concerning horizontal acquisitions and mergers 
subject to section 7 of the Clayton Act, section 1 of the Sherman Act, or section 5 of the 
FTC Act.
8 They are considered to be the foremost articulation of the government’s policy 
regarding enforcement standards for horizontal mergers (Werden, 1997).  Their purpose 
is to convey the analytical framework by which the government is to go about 
determining the extent to which a merger is likely to lessen competition.  
Though the first guidelines were released in 1968 and modified as recently as 
2010, the thrust of the criteria for market definition was pioneered largely in the 1982 
version.
9 The approach to market definition in the 1982 guidelines focused on the central 
enforcement-related question of whether a merger would result in a price increase 
through the use of the “SSNIP” criterion.  In the SSNIP criterion, an antitrust market is 
defined as a group of products and a geographic area in which a hypothetical profit-
maximizing firm, not subject to price regulation, that was the only present and future 
seller of those products in that area would impose a “small but significant and non-
                                                 
8 Mergers subject to section 7 are prohibited if their effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to 
tend to create a monopoly.”  Mergers subject to section 1 are prohibited if they constitute a “contract, 
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade.” Mergers are subject to section 5 if they constitute an 
“unfair method of competition.” 
9 The FTC joined the DOJ in releasing joint guidelines beginning in 1992.   6
transitory increase in price” (SSNIP) above all prevailing or likely future levels holding 
constant the terms of sale for all products produced elsewhere. As a general matter, it 
defined a price increase as significant if it was at least 5% and lasted for one year.
10 The 
general idea in this process is to find the smallest group of products or firms for which 
there are no close substitutes, thus allowing such a hypothetical monopolist to exert 
market power.
11 
The development of this concept was notable in that the economic reasoning was 
comprehensible to both attorneys and economists, and the methodology was operable. 
Though economists and attorneys still differ on the implementation aspect of market 
definition analysis, the basis for these disagreements is typically methodological rather 
than the fundamental theoretical question of what defines a market (Scheffman et al., 
2002).  To this day the SSNIP criterion continues to be the standard by which courts 
define antitrust markets.  
The determination of market boundaries using the SSNIP test provides the basis 
on which any subsequent steps rest when evaluating a merger. As Miles (2005) details, 
                                                 
10 This was later refined in 1984 to ensure that 5% was not a rule, but 5% has nonetheless remained a 
standard utilized in hospital merger cases by the courts. This was indicated in the Sutter case, as the court 
requires a basis for deviating from this prescribed 5% figure. See California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. 
Supp. 2d 1057 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd mem., 2000-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) U 87,665 (9th Cir. 2000), revised, 130 F. 
Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
11 It should be noted that although the SSNIP test mandates that other prices be held constant, the 
assumption of Bertrand competition assumes that reaction functions of other firms are upward sloping in 
the prices of all other firms, and thus other firms would raise prices in reaction to the increase in price by a 
firm. For this reason, the sizes SSNIP estimates of geographic markets are most likely an upper bound. This 
is because upward sloping reaction functions for competitors (and thus higher prices) would induce less 
substitution away from the hospitals included in the SSNIP test, and thus would require a smaller number 
of coordinated price increases in order to increase profit. For an alternative approach that asks whether the 
candidates in the market would increase prices by at least 5% in equilibrium, see Ivaldi and Lőrincz (2009). 
   7
the court is required to follow a sequence of steps in determining the legality of a merger 
consisting of
12: 
1. Definition of the relevant product market. 
2. Definition of the relevant geographic market. 
3. Identification of the competitors in the market defined from steps (1) and (2). 
4. Calculation of market shares and Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) of the 
competitors in the market. 
5. Calculation of merging firms’ post-merger market share and the level of post-merger 
HHI. If this is too high, the merger is determined unlawful. 
6. Consideration of other factors that indicate that the merger is unlikely to have 
anticompetitive effects, such as ease of entry, ownership status, excess capacity and 
efficiency gains. 
 
  The first two steps involved in merger analysis are pivotal to the process in each 
subsequent step. The inclusion of many products will understate market concentration, 
while failure to include relevant products will overstate concentration. Likewise, the 
delineation of geographic markets is fundamental to the determination of the degree of 
market power. The inclusion of an inappropriately large number of firms will overstate 
the degree of competition, while failure to incorporate all firms involved will understate 
the prevailing competitive environment. 
  Once the market boundaries have been set, the merger guidelines specify levels 
and changes in the HHI which serve as a guide as to when mergers are likely to be anti-
competitive.
13 According to the 2010 guidelines, markets with a post-merger HHI below 
                                                 
12 The current (2010) guidelines offer more flexibility than in the past, in that “The Agencies’ analysis need 
not start with market definition….although evaluation of competitive alternatives available to customers is 
always necessary at some point in the analysis.” (FTC/DOJ, 2010, p. 7) 
13 Because the thresholds set by the guidelines are intended to be a reference point, the FTC has been 
flexible in their enforcement of mergers conforming to these exact HHI thresholds. See Merger Challenges   8
1,500 are said to be unconcentrated and are thus unlikely to have adverse competitive 
effects. Markets with post-merger HHIs between 1,500 and 2,500 are regarded as 
moderately concentrated and are likely to warrant scrutiny only if a merger will result in 
an increase in the HHI of more than 100. Mergers resulting in a post-merger HHI of 
above 2,500 are regarded as resulting in markets that are highly concentrated and thus 
mergers producing an increase in HHI of between 100 and 200 are presumed to raise 
significant competitive concerns, with increases of 200 points or more deemed likely to 
enhance market power. 
 
Application of the Merger Guidelines to Hospital Care 
In the case of hospital care, the relevant product market has not been an issue of 
contention in merger cases. The generally accepted product market definition has been to 
“cluster” products, leading to a typical product market definition of “general acute care 
hospital services.”
14 In only one of the last eight cases brought by the government has 
failure to convincingly define a product market been a deciding factor in a hospital 
merger case.
 15 
The inability to convincingly define geographic markets for hospital care has, 
however, been the primary determining factor in six of the government’s seven 
consecutive unsuccessful merger challenges between 1994 and 1999. Table 1 presents a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Data, Fiscal Years 1999–2003, Issued by the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of 
Justice at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/12/mdp.pdf 
14 Health Care Mergers and Acquisitions Handbook, Section of Antitrust Law (American Bar Association, 
2003), p. 30 
15 See United States of America v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center and North Shore Health System, 
Inc., 983 F. Supp. 121 (1997).   9
list of the most recent cases challenged by the government, as well as the size of the 
geographic markets and level of concentration in each market.
16  
 
II. Quantitative Approaches to Geographic Market Definition 
  As discussed above, market definition is pivotal to the antitrust process. Failure to 
correctly define a market may have serious consequences in antitrust cases. However, 
because the merger guidelines prescribe their methodology through a thought experiment 
rather than a concrete methodology, there is no uniform approach for defining these 
markets. As a result, numerous quantitative approaches have been suggested and applied 
across many industries including beverages, software, hospitals and supermarkets. These 
include approaches based on product shipments, methodologies incorporating 
econometric methods and merger simulation, and analysis of consummated mergers.
17 
Since we are using the hospital industry as our example, and since market definition 
issues in this industry have revolved around geographic, rather than product markets, our 
discussion in what follows will focus on geographic markets. It should be understood, 
however, that the methodological issues are essentially the same regardless of whether 




                                                 
16 Only a fraction of the merger activity that has occurred has been challenged due to the issuance of the 
Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care which stipulated that mergers involving 
hospitals with (1) less than 100 licensed beds, (2) less than 40 daily patients over the past 3 years, (3) a 
merger that has been in existence for more than 5 years would not be challenged (see 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hlth3s.htm). 
17 Although market definition cases rely upon quantitative methods as a basis for merger evaluation, these 
cases often use factual qualitative evidence as well, such as testimony from buyers of the relevant product. 
18 Once can think of geographic location as a product attribute, in which case there’s no real difference 
between product and geographic markets.     10
Shipments-based approaches have been commonly employed for geographic 




21 and are, to the best of our knowledge, the only quantitative approaches 
employed in hospital merger cases. The two methodologies most heavily utilized, 
referred to as Elzinga-Hogarty and Critical Loss Analysis, rely on discharge (shipments) 
data which are usually available from the hospitals themselves or from state reporting 
agencies. Because of their utilization in the vast majority of hospital merger cases, we 
focus mainly on these approaches in our analysis, as our aim is to examine market 
definition methodology as it has been utilized in practice.  Table 2 lists the market 
definition methods used in actual hospital merger cases.  
  
Elzinga-Hogarty 
The Elzinga-Hogarty method, (Elzinga and Hogarty, 1973, 1978) uses shipments 
information consisting of origin and destination data for delineating a market. Although 
not originally developed for use in the hospital industry, as Table 2 indicates, it has been 
utilized extensively in hospital merger cases.
  The Elzinga-Hogarty method determines 
that a geographic area constitutes a market if that area satisfies a joint ratio of import and 
export thresholds. The simultaneous satisfaction of these thresholds is evidence of the 
self-sufficiency of the area for both demand and supply, and is thus a geographic market. 
The method argues that if an area imports little of a particular product, it can be deemed a 
market from a demand perspective. By similar logic, Elzinga and Hogarty argue that if an 
                                                 
19 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., (1966)   
20 United States v. Eastman Kodak Co. (1995) 
21 United States v. Oracle Corp., (2004)   11
area exports little of a particular product, it can be deemed a market from a supply 
perspective.  
While Elzinga-Hogarty has frequently been acknowledged by the courts as an 
acceptable method by which to define geographic markets, there are a number of 
criticisms regarding the potential shortcomings of geographic markets defined using this 
methodology, with particular attention devoted to its limitations for defining hospital 
markets.
 22 The first centers on heterogeneity by geography in quality or service. This 
issue is particularly relevant in high-service, tertiary care urban hospitals which draw 
large inflows of patients from rural areas. If a sufficient number of rural patients obtain 
care at the urban hospitals, the Elzinga-Hogarty test could conclude that the urban and 
rural areas are in the same geographic market, even though the price of care in the rural 
region does not constrain the market power of the urban hospitals. As Werden (1990) 
indicates, this scenario leads to markets that are larger than would be reasonable given 
the hypothetical monopolist principle put forth in the merger guidelines.  
Alternatively, the use of shipments data can underestimate the size of markets. As 
Werden (1981) illustrates, two firms may be close substitutes for each other but have no 
cross shipments between the regions in which they are located (due to consumers 
optimizing based on transportation costs). In this case Elzinga-Hogarty would 
erroneously conclude that each firm and its corresponding region constitute a market, 
despite the competitive constraints present due to their high cross price elasticities.   
Other critical assessments of the methodology’s implications for behavior focus on its 
static nature which makes consumer behavioral assumptions based on the pre-merger 
                                                 
22In the most recent hospital merger case (In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation, 
Docket No. 9315, FTC August 2007) Elzinga himself testified that the method is not appropriate for 
hospital market definition.   12
rather than post-merger terms of sale, and the “silent majority” criticism of Capps et al. 
(2001) which implicitly assumes that if some patients are willing to travel to a more 




Critical Loss Analysis 
Critical Loss analysis (Harris and Simons, 1989) has been widely employed in 
merger analysis since its introduction in 1989 (Epstein and Rubinfeld, 2004). It seeks to 
directly answer the question posed by the merger guidelines regarding the smallest set of 
hospitals that would have to be included in the market to make a hypothetical price 
increase of 5% profitable. Although it has been used less frequently than the Elzinga-
Hogarty methodology, Critical Loss has played an important role in determining 
geographic markets in industries such as chewing tobacco
24 and supermarkets,
25 and in 
hospital cases such as the Dubuque, Poplar Bluff and Sutter cases detailed in Table 2. In 
addition, in the Poplar Bluff case mentioned above, the circuit court gave substantial 
weight to the defendant’s Critical Loss analysis in its reversal of the district court’s initial 
ruling (Langenfeld and Li, 2001).  
  The Critical Loss test proceeds in three steps. For a given set of firms, the first 
step is to determine, for a given price increase, the percentage reduction in demand that 
would render such a price increase unprofitable. This percentage reduction is a function 
                                                 
23 For a summary of the arguments and evidence against the use of shipments based methods in the context 
of a recent case, see “Brief of Health Care and Industrial Organization Economists as Amici Curia in 
Support of Petitioners,” Little Rock Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist Health, No. 09-1183, in the Supreme 
Court of the United States. http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/09-1183_Amicus-
brief-of-the-Health-Care-and-Industrial-Organization-Economists.pdf (accessed August 13, 2010). 
24 FTC v. Swedish Match North America Inc., and National Tobacco Company, LP. 
25 FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc. and Wild Oats Mkt., Inc.   13
of the proposed price increase (typically fixed at 5%) and the gross margin of the firm. 
For a firm with high margins, the loss of relatively few consumers will significantly 
impact profitability, while low margin firms would need to lose fewer customers in order 
to impose the same impact on profitability. The second step involves calculating the 
actual percentage of sales that a firm would lose were they to increase their price by a 
given percentage. This is called the estimated loss. The third step entails comparing the 
Critical Loss with the estimated loss. If the estimated loss is greater than the Critical 
Loss, this area does not constitute a market as defined by the SSNIP test.
26 The market is 
then expanded to include firms that are viewed as the next closest substitutes for the 
group of hospitals in question.  
  While the principles of Critical Loss rest upon sound economic reasoning, in 
practice the implementation of Critical Loss has been subject to a number of criticisms. 
One criticism concerns the classification of accounting cost data used for the 
determination of the contribution margin, as the use of such data to calculate the 
contribution margin allows for discretion in the classification of fixed versus variable 
costs. An incentive exists for merging parties to classify a large portion of their costs as 
fixed, since such classification reduces the scope of costs that can be determined as 
variable, thus resulting in the determination of a high contribution margin and large 
Critical Loss markets (Langenfeld and Li, 2001).  
The implementation methods used in the determination of the estimated loss have 
also been subject to criticism, particularly as they have been employed in hospital merger 
cases. This is because in practice, determination of the estimated loss in hospital merger 
                                                 
26 Health Care Mergers and Acquisitions Handbook, Section of Antitrust Law (American Bar Association, 
2003) p. 52-54   14
cases has entailed examining zip codes in which a significant percentage (e.g. 20% or 
more) of patients already use other hospitals. It is then argued that given a price increase, 
a significant number of patients in these zip codes would switch to an alternative hospital 
and make such an increase unprofitable. Such claims are, however, disputed since the 
high contribution margins claimed by analysts also imply that the actual loss sustained by 
a firm would be small. This is because the presence of a large contribution margin 
implies a low elasticity of demand and consequently, a small actual loss (Katz and 
Shapiro, 2003; Danger and Frech, 2001).  Furthermore, a paper by Simpson (2001) 
argues that in areas deemed contestable (presumably indicating a high elasticity of 
demand), price increases at nearby hospitals in actuality induce very small numbers of 
patients to switch, thus indicating that demand is in fact less elastic in these contestable 
zip codes than has been put forward in hospital merger cases. 
 
 
III. Market Definition Using a Structural Model   
 
Using the Structural Model for Market Definition 
In what follows, we employ a structural model of market competition to 
implement the SSNIP test method to define hospital markets in California.  We then go 
on to compare the markets obtained via the SSNIP test with those via the methods that 
have been commonly employed in hospital merger cases (Elzinga-Hogarty and Critical 
Loss).     15
 The structural model estimates demand and supply relation parameters and builds 
on the work of Baker and Bresnahan (1985), Scheffman and Spiller (1987), and Froeb 
and Werden (2000). We employ a model based on Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes’s (2004) 
model of differentiated product oligopoly and adapted for use in the hospital industry by 
Gaynor and Vogt (2003).  The model is well suited to the SSNIP criteria in that it is a 
fully specified model of price and quantity determination and it allows for the calculation 
of own-price and cross-price elasticities for each hospital in the data. In addition, it 
allows for the determination of an initial equilibrium price and quantity for the market, 
thus allowing for direct implementation of the thought experiment characterized by the 
merger guidelines.  
  This structural model of differentiated product oligopoly models demand at the 
level of an individual consumer using discrete choice techniques and micro data on 
individuals. This allows demographic characteristics at the level of individual consumers 
to explain hospital choice. In addition, its use of multinomial logit demand implies that 
the use of the model for merger predictions will result in lower post-merger prices (and 
thus larger antitrust markets) than would be produced by alternative specifications 
(Crooke et al., 1999). While this section presents the basic constructs of the model, for a 
full exposition, including parameter estimates, see Gaynor and Vogt (2003).   
With a choice set of j (j=1,…..J) hospitals, the utility of consumer i(=1,….,N) is 
assumed to be of the form: 
                       
               ξ           (1) 
where    is the hospital price,    is the marginal utility of income, X are observable 
consumer characteristics, observable hospital characteristics and their interactions,   are   16
consumer and hospital characteristics interacted with price and    are unobservable 
hospital characteristics. Assuming that     is an i.i.d. Weibull random variable, the 
probability that consumer i attends hospital j can be written as: 
 
         
                
∑                 
 
   
      ( 2 )  
 
and the demand faced by hospital j charging price pj can be written as: 
 
        ∑          
 
           ( 3 )  
 
where    is the quantity of hospital goods consumed by consumer i. 
  Because equation (1) contains an unobservable term (  ) that is correlated with 
price, a set of hospital fixed effects are used to absorb this source of endogeneity, as 
proposed by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (2004).  Since the use of this fixed effect 
obfuscates identification of   , an additional regression of these hospital fixed effects on 
hospital price and other observable hospital characteristics is used to recover this 
parameter. Because price is also endogenous in this additional regression, exogenous 
wages and predicted quantity (using only geographic distribution and exogenous 
consumer characteristics) are used as instruments for price, thus enabling recovery of   , 
the marginal utility of income.   17
  In this model, firms are assumed to maximize profits à la Bertrand.
27 Multi-plant 
firms (called multihospital systems) are also common in this industry, necessitating a 
model which accounts for substitution among plants and the coordination of pricing. 
Letting θ represent a J×J matrix with θjk = 1 if hospitals j and k have the same owner and 
θjk = 0 otherwise, the familiar Bertrand pricing equation used in the model is of the form: 
 
           Θ⊗  
 Q
    
  
      ( 4 )  
where    /    is the  J×J demand derivative matrix and ⊗ denotes an element-by-
element Hadamard matrix multiplication operator.  
Of note for this model is that it allows for observed consumer heterogeneity via 
varying distances from consumers to hospitals and thus does not exhibit independence of 
irrelevant alternatives or the restrictive substitution patterns of the logit (Train, 2003). 
Using the estimates obtained from this model, own-price and cross-price elasticities can 
be calculated for each hospital in the dataset using the formulas: 
   
   
   
  ∑        1                 
      
       (5) 
 
   
   
   
  ∑                   
      
        ( 6 )  
 
where (5) corresponds to the calculation of the own-price, and (6) to the cross-price 
elasticity. 
                                                 
27 Not-for-profit firms are common in this industry.  Not-for-profit hospitals are assumed to value output 
(e.g., community service, access to care).  This makes not-for-profits, in essence, like for-profits with lower 
marginal costs.  The econometric model allows for marginal cost (and demand) differences between for-
profits and not-for-profits.   18
We present a summary of the key model characteristics in Table 3.
28  Hospitals 
face a downward sloping demand curve, with average own-price elasticity of -4.57 and 
an average price of $4,681 for a unit of care. Additionally, as the average cross-price 
elasticities in the bottom of Table 3 show, hospitals physically close to one another have 
higher cross-price elasticities than do hospitals far apart. For example, the average cross-
price elasticity between a given hospital and its most proximate competitor (measured by 
distance) is calculated as 0.60, while the cross-price elasticity with the fifth-closest 
competitor is one-third of this magnitude. This implies that markets for hospital care are 
largely local.  
 
Adapting the Structural Model for SSNIP Market Definition 
In order to define geographic markets that conform as closely as possible to the 
Merger Guidelines using the structural model, we define the SSNIP test for a given 
hospital as the smallest set of hospitals (inclusive of the hospitals for which we are 
attempting to define a SSNIP market) for which a given price increase would be 
profitable, holding constant price at all other hospitals. While a formal definition of our 
SSNIP markets is included in Appendix B, intuitively, the SSNIP criterion states that for 
a given hospital, j, a SSNIP market is the smallest set of hospitals for which an increase 
in price at this set of hospitals (including hospital j) would increase the collective profits 
in the systems of which these hospitals are members. This approach allows for the 
definition of geographic markets that take into account system membership, making it 
consistent with the current (2010) revision of the merger guidelines in its explicit 
                                                 
28 All coefficient estimates are available at 
http://www.rje.org/abstracts/abstracts/2003/rje.winter03.gaynor.pdf   19
treatment of firms that own multiple plants in the same geographic area.
29  To illustrate 
the criterion, consider 4 hospitals, A, B, C and D, and let A and B be members of the 
same hospital system. Suppose hospitals A and C act as a “hypothetical monopolist” and 
engage in a coordinated price increase of 5% (holding the terms of sale constant at all 
other locations), resulting in a decrease in demand at both hospitals and a decrease in 
profits at the combined hospital entity of A and C. Suppose, however, that B is a 
sufficiently adequate substitute for care at these hospitals so that the increase in profit as 
a result of the increase in demand for hospital B’s services is greater than the decrease in 
profits at the combined hospital entity of A and C. Hospitals A and C would be a market 
under the SSNIP criterion, as the collective profits in the systems of which these hospitals 
are members has increased. Likewise, if hospital D is a close substitute for the care 
rendered at A and C while hospital B is not, hospital B would see little or no increase in 
demand or profits and thus hospitals A and C would not be considered a market 
according to the SSNIP criterion.    
In the event that a price increase at a given location results in a reduction of sales that 
would be large enough such that a hypothetical monopolist would not find it profitable to 
impose an increase in price, the merger guidelines suggest adding the location from 
which production is the next-best substitute for production at the merging firm’s location. 
Because spatial differentiation is an important attribute of hospital care, when a SSNIP is 
not profitable, we include additional hospitals in order of their geographic proximity to 
the location of the merging hospital(s) in question. Our algorithm for implementing 
                                                 
29 The 2010 merger guidelines require that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm that was the only present 
or future producer of the relevant product(s) located in the region would impose at least a SSNIP from at 
least one location, including at least one location of one of the merging firms. They also explicitly state that 
a single firm may operate in a number of different geographic markets.   20
SSNIP markets using the structural Bertrand model (SSNIP Market Definition) is as 
follows: 
 
1.  Begin with a hospital for which one would like to define a geographic market. 
2.  Find the hospital geographically closest to the hospital chosen in step 1.  
3.  Raise the price of only these hospitals by a given percentage (we use 5%) and 
allow demand to change as a result of the price increase. 
4.  If the total difference in profits for the hospital system (given diversion to other 
hospitals in the same system) is positive, this constitutes a market by the SSNIP 
test. If it does not, we add the next hospital that is geographically closest to the 
hospital in step 1. 
 
We repeat this process until the increase in price for the chosen hospitals results in a 
positive difference in profits.
30 
 
IV.  Comparison Methodology for Implementing the SSNIP Test 
  In our implementation of market definition, we employ the two versions of the 
shipments-based techniques, Elzinga-Hogarty and Critical Loss, detailed in Section II. 
Specifically, we seek to compare the geographic markets defined by the SSNIP criterion 
using the structural model with the markets implied by the two most commonly 
employed quantitative geographic market definition techniques for hospital merger cases. 
                                                 
30 Note that this algorithm allows for hospitals which are close substitutes and also members of the same 
system to capture each others’ demand as the result of a price increase at one of the hospitals. Additionally, 
because the current merger guidelines require only that a SSNIP be imposed at only one location, our 
algorithm produces markets that are likely larger than would be implied by the current (2010) revision of 
the merger guidelines.   21




As previously described, the Elzinga-Hogarty method of geographic market 
definition uses shipments information consisting of origin and destination data for 
delineating a market. It specifies the use of the “little in from outside” measure (LIFO) to 
determine the geographic extent of demand while the “little out from inside” measure 
(LOFI) determines the geographic extent of supply. The simultaneous satisfaction of a 
given threshold for each of these measures is evidence of a geographic market. The 
thresholds recommended in the original article are .75 for a “weak market” and .9 for a 
“strong market.” With regard to hospital care, Elzinga-Hogarty can be thought of as a 
joint ratio of import and export thresholds by which to judge the self-sufficiency of a 
particular market. We define the “import” of health care as an individual leaving an area 
in order to be treated, and the “export” of health care as an individual from another area 
(other than the one being analyzed) being treated in the relevant area. Elzinga-Hogarty 
posits that if an area imports little of its health care, it can be deemed a market from the 
demand perspective, as few individuals see the need to leave the area to be treated. Thus 
as the import ratio, defined as  
 
import ratio 
patient outflows from area of interest into any other area
total discharges from area of interest
 
   22
gets increasingly small, 1-(import ratio) gets increasingly large. LIFO is thus defined as 
1-(import ratio). 
Similarly, Elzinga-Hogarty posits that if an area exports little of its health care, it 
can be deemed a market from the supply perspective. Thus as the export ratio of 
healthcare defined as  
export ratio=
patient inflows from other areas into this area
total discharges from hospitals in this area
 
 
gets increasingly small, this is equivalent of 1-(export ratio) getting increasingly large. 
LOFI is thus defined as 1-(export ratio). 
There are numerous ways in which Elzinga-Hogarty markets can be calculated. 
Specifically, the means by which one expands a market that does not meet the prescribed 
LIFO and LOFI criteria can affect the size of the market determined for a given hospital. 
Frech et al. (2004) propose six methods for expanding an Elzinga-Hogarty market based 
on the geographic area from which a given hospital draws its patients. For our purposes, 
we employ the method of expansion termed “contiguous search” to expand the market. 
This version of Elzinga-Hogarty market definition proceeds in 3 steps: The first step in 
expanding the market is to set a threshold at which the simultaneous satisfaction of this 
threshold for both LIFO and LOFI constitutes a market. The contiguous search method 
then proceeds by first choosing a zip code for which one would like to calculate an 
Elzinga-Hogarty market. LIFO and LOFI are calculated for this zip code. If either LIFO 
or LOFI is less than the prescribed threshold, one chooses the zip code that contributes 
most to the minimum of LIFO and LOFI, from the universe of zip codes contiguous to   23
the zip code of interest.
31  For each additional zip code, zj, that is contiguous to the 
combination of zip codes already included in the service area from previous iterations, z-j, 
zip code zi is added, one at a time if it satisfies (for each iteration): 
 
            m a x                 ,     ,max          ,            
 
Zip codes continue to be added until both LIFO and LOFI equal the prescribed 
threshold. For our analysis, we use the “weak market” criterion of 0.75 as our threshold.  
As Frech et al. (2004) detail in their work, this method is one of the two approaches that 
produce markets which are relatively compact and contiguous, and produce the most 
realistic geographic markets. In addition, our choice of the weak market threshold of 0.75 
rather than the strong market threshold of 0.9 is because in practice, it is virtually 
impossible to obtain an Elzinga-Hogarty market for hospital care at a threshold of 0.9 for 
some markets in our data, short of including most of the state.  
 
Critical Loss Simulation 
In Critical Loss analysis, for a given price increase, the percentage reduction in 







                                                 
31 Because of data limitations, we use a fixed radius between zip code centroids to create the universe of zip 
codes by which to expand the market, rather than shared zip code borders.   24
where Y is the proportion increase in price (5% in the case of the SSNIP test) and CM is 
the contribution margin defined as 
P‐AVC
P .
32  This value of X is called the “Critical Loss.” 
We employ a method based on previous cases for both the estimated contribution margin 
as well as the estimated actual loss. Though calculation of contribution margins is 
theoretically a straightforward exercise, in practice the calculation of these margins for 
hospitals in merger cases is subject to the discretion of the analyst as to the definition of 
fixed cost and variable cost. Consequently, our implementation of Critical Loss utilizes 
approximations of these margins based on past merger cases rather than attempting to 
extrapolate the classification of costs according to merging parties. The contribution 
margin assumed in these cases has ranged from 41.4% in State of California v. Sutter 
Health System to 65.9% in FTC v. Tenet. 
33 
  For our simulation of the estimated loss, we employ a method of determining the 
“contestable zip codes” for a market of hospitals, meaning the collection of zip codes in 
which at least a fixed percentage of the patients travel to hospitals other than those 
posited as a potential market. It is then hypothesized that for these zip codes, if a given 
increase in price were to be implemented, the demonstrated willingness of individuals in 
these zip codes to travel outside of the proposed market for care at the present terms of 
sale is evidence that a sufficient number of substitutes exist. Thus it is put forward that a 
SSNIP would induce a significant number of these patients to switch to hospitals not 
implementing such an increase in price. Given that our goal is to approximate Critical 
Loss markets as determined by previous cases, we utilize a method similar, although not 
identical, to the contestable zip code method. Whereas the contestable zip code method 
                                                 
32 See Harris and Simons (1989) p. 212-215 for the derivation of these formulas. 
33 Langenfeld and Li (2001) p. 325-329.   25
determines the contestable zip codes and then states the number from these zip codes that 
would have to leave in order to make a price increase unprofitable, we instead impose a 
fixed percentage that would  leave contestable zip codes for a given price increase. This 
step is necessary in order to implement an algorithm to find Critical Loss markets rather 
than define an arbitrary market and then hypothesize about the behavior of the patients in 
this area necessary to make this area a market of a given size. Though this actual loss 
number is not clearly defined and could vary greatly by case, we base our actual loss 
numbers on the determination in the Sutter case that suggested that the number of patients 
traveling into the proposed market that would have to switch is between one-third and 
two-thirds.  
Given that the court ruled in favor of the defendant, we interpret this figure to be 
indicative of the court’s conclusion of the likely substitution patterns of hospital 
patients.
34 In our calculation of Critical Loss, we apply a contribution margin of 55% 
which would determine that the Critical Loss is approximately 8.3% for a 5% increase in 
price. We define zip codes as contestable if 25% or more patients travel to hospitals other 
than those being defined in a hypothetical merger. Finally, we assume that of the patients 
that currently receive care at one of the merging hospitals, 30% of these patients from zip 
codes deemed contestable (i.e. have at least 25% outflows under the pre-merger terms of 
sale) would substitute to another hospital as a result of a 5% increase in price.
35  
                                                 
34 We do acknowledge, however that the number of patients that were determined to travel into the market 
accounted for only 15% of the total discharges in question. The set of contestable zip codes often does 
constitute a larger subset of discharges than was determined “out of the market” in the Sutter case. 
35 Our algorithm works as follows: 
1)  Start with a hospital and the hospital closest to this hospital. 
2)  Find the universe of Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) served by the hospitals chosen. 
3)  Find the contestable zip codes given this universe of DRGs. 
4)  Calculate the actual loss by assuming that 30% of the patients currently attending the hospitals of 
interest in the contestable zip codes acquire their care elsewhere.   26
 
V. Data 
We use 1995 data from California’s Office of Statewide Health Planning and 
Development (OSHPD) which maintains a variety of datasets on various aspects of health 
care in the state.
36 Below we briefly describe each of the particular datasets we draw upon 
and the criteria for selecting subsets of the data.  
 
Discharge data 
Among the items collected by OSHPD for each discharge are patient 
demographics, diagnosis, treatment, an identifier for the hospital at which the patient 
sought care, the patient’s zip code of residence, and charges.  
 
Annual and Quarterly Financial data 
 Annual financial disclosures are submitted each fiscal year and every time a 
hospital changes ownership. From these data, we use information on location of the 
hospital, ownership of the hospital, type of care provided by the hospital, whether the 
hospital is a teaching hospital or not, and wages. Quarterly financial disclosures are 
submitted by calendar quarters, so that they are synchronized both with the discharge data 
and with one another. 
 
Selections 
                                                                                                                                                 
5)  Compare the loss calculated in (4) to the critical loss figure of 8.3% of original demand. If actual 
loss is greater than critical loss, we add the next closest hospital and repeat steps 1-4. If not, the set 
of hospitals is determined to be a market.  
36 http://www.oshpd.state.ca.us/   27
 For 1995, there are a total of 3.6 million patient discharges. For our analysis we 
use only those discharges whose payment comes from private sources. These are 
discharges in the HMO, PPO, other private, self-pay, and Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
categories. This amounts to 1.47 million discharges. Our motivation in making these 
choices is that for patients in these categories, some entity is making explicit choices 
among hospitals, based, at least in part, on price. In the case of the various insurance 
categories, insurers have discretion both over which hospitals to include in their networks 
of approved providers and via any channeling of patients to less expensive hospitals. 
We also eliminate patients with a DRG frequency of less than 1,000, patients with 
missing values for any of the variables used in any of our analyses, patients with charges 
less than $500 or greater than $500,000 and consumers with lengths of stay of zero or 
greater than 30. After all the exclusions, there are 913,547 remaining observations. 
Of the 593 total hospitals in the financial data, we exclude hospitals such as 
psychiatric hospitals, children’s hospitals, rehabilitation hospitals, and other specialty 
institutions, as well as hospitals associated with staff model HMOs. In addition we 
exclude hospitals with either missing or useless quarterly financial data (some hospitals 
had larger deductions from revenue than they had gross revenue, for example). We also 
exclude hospitals with fewer than 100 discharges for the year. Finally, we drop hospitals 
whose closest competitor (in terms of distance) is in another state. This is because our 
data precludes us from observing hospitals in neighboring states which could presumably 
be reasonable substitutes for those hospitals located on a state border. This leaves us with 
an analysis sample of 913,547 discharges and 368 hospitals.  




  In order to compare markets delineated by using the three different methodologies 
described above, we define markets using Critical Loss, Elzinga-Hogarty and the SSNIP 
market definition using the structural model for all hospitals in our data.  
Table 4 reveals substantial differences in the markets defined by the methodologies in 
both the number of hospitals in each market, as well as the degree of concentration as 
defined by the HHI measures. SSNIP market definition using the structural model 
determines that the median hospital operates in a market of 3 hospitals with an HHI of 
3,814.
37 This is well above the threshold determined by the merger guidelines as being 
highly concentrated. In contrast, our version of Critical Loss concludes that the median 
hospital operates in a market with 16 hospitals and an HHI of 1,194. Elzinga-Hogarty 
defines markets similar to Critical Loss, with the median hospital operating in a market 
with 12 other hospitals and an HHI of 1,499. Thus under the merger guidelines, both the 
Critical Loss and Elzinga-Hogarty methods would find that the median hospital exists in 
a market that is unconcentrated.  
Many health economics studies use political boundaries to define markets, such as 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA), or Health Service Areas (HSA), which are defined 
based on commuting patterns and patient flows respectively (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007, 
page 895; Makuc, 1991). Therefore we also examine the implications of using these 
boundaries to define geographic markets.  This produces the lowest concentration 
                                                 
37 We use available beds in our calculation of HHI by market. The correlation between beds, total 
discharges and total patient days and other standard measures of hospital output is above .9 for all 
measures.   29
measures of all market definition approaches. Using MSAs to define geographic markets 
implies that the median hospital operates in a market with 18 hospitals and an HHI of 
1,191, while defining geographic markets using HSAs infers that the median hospital 
operates in a market with 15 other hospitals and an HHI of 1,191. 
  A more detailed breakdown of the hospitals by geographic area reveals a 
substantial amount about the competitive environment for hospitals based upon their 
location.  Dividing the hospitals in the sample into hospital “density quartiles” based on 
the number of hospitals within a 25-mile radius exposes the wide variation in the 
methodologies’ market definition for urban and rural areas. Quartile 1 includes hospitals 
with 0-5 other hospitals within a 25-mile radius, quartile 2 includes hospitals with 6-18 
other hospitals within a 25-mile radius, quartile 3 includes hospitals with 19-70 other 
hospitals within a 25-mile radius, while quartile 4 includes hospitals with 71-110 other 
hospitals within a 25-mile radius.  Figure 1 maps these hospital density quartiles while 
Table 5 shows the characteristics of hospitals within these quartiles  
As can be seen in Figure 1, the wide variability in the number of other hospitals 
within a 25-mile radius is due to the difference in hospital density in urban and rural 
areas. In particular, quartile 4 consists entirely of hospitals in Los Angeles County and 
Orange County, while quartile 3 consists of hospitals from the Los Angeles (44.3%), San 
Francisco-San Jose (37.5%) and San Diego (18.2%) metro areas. Quartile 1 consists of 
mostly Northern California hospitals, hospitals in coastal towns and on the far outskirts of 
metro areas, while quartile 2 comprises a mix of hospitals on the periphery of the 5 major   30
metro areas in California, as well as the hospitals located in the central part of the state 
between San Francisco and Los Angeles.
38    
  As would be expected, the size of the geographic markets using all three of the 
methodologies indicates that markets are more concentrated in areas where there are 
fewer nearby hospitals and less concentrated in areas where there are more hospitals 
close by. The magnitude of the concentration difference, however, varies substantially 
depending on the density quartile. In particular, in quartile 1, all methodologies indicate 
that the mean level of market concentration is somewhat high, although the structural 
model produces markets where the mean level of market concentration is higher than that 
implied by both Elzinga-Hogarty and Critical Loss. However, in this quartile, Elzinga-
Hogarty and Critical Loss agree with SSNIP market definition on the size of the market 
in 22 and 10 of the 93 cases respectively, and produce smaller markets in some cases. 
This stands in contrast to quartile 3 and 4 in which neither shipments-based methodology 
produces markets of comparable size to markets defined using the structural model.    
   As is evident from Table 5, all three of the methodologies produce markets that 
include more hospitals in areas with greater hospital density. However, though the change 
in the level of concentration by market is directionally equivalent, the magnitudes of the 
concentration levels differ substantially. This suggests that although the shipments-based 
methods are consistent in their determination that antitrust markets encompass a larger 
number of hospitals in areas with greater hospital density (i.e. urban areas), the difference 
in market sizes determined by these methods are substantially larger than those implied 
by the structural model, and these differences are greater as the number of surrounding 
                                                 
38 The 5 largest Metro areas in California are Fresno, Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Diego and San 
Francisco.   31
hospitals increases. In Los Angeles, for example, in density quartile 4, Elzinga-Hogarty 
must include an average of 50 hospitals (and over 100 zip codes) in order to produce a 
market, whereas Critical Loss must include an average of 65 hospitals in order for the 
loss from contestable zip codes to be sufficiently small so as to produce a market. In 
contrast SSNIP market definition finds that the average hospital in this quartile operates 
in a market with just 5 other hospitals. In quartile 1 on the other hand, Elzinga-Hogarty 
specifies a market with an average of 7.19 hospitals and Critical Loss determines that an 
average market in this quartile includes 5.8 hospitals. Market definition using the 
structural model determines that in this quartile, the average hospital market consists of 
just 2.78 hospitals 
  The bottom panel of Table 5 also reveals a great deal about the market 
concentration according to the prescribed thresholds set by the merger guidelines.
39 
Across quartiles, both Critical Loss and Elzinga-Hogarty indicate that markets become 
less concentrated as we move from quartile 1 to quartile 4. The percentage of hospitals 
operating in markets with HHIs of less than 1,500 for Critical Loss increases from 8.6% 
in quartile 1 to 100% in quartile 4. Likewise, for Elzinga-Hogarty, the percentage of 
hospitals in markets with HHIs of less than 1,500 increases from 16.1% in quartile 1 to 
100% in quartile 4. SSNIP market definition using the Bertrand model finds only five 
markets with HHIs of less than 1,500 in any concentration quartile.  
  The number of markets considered highly concentrated (HHI greater than 2,500) 
also show significant changes across concentration quartiles. The percentage of hospitals 
operating in markets with HHIs of greater than 2,500 according to Critical Loss decreases 
                                                 
39 While the guidelines specify thresholds for post-merger market shares, the HHIs discussed below are pre-
merger market shares. Nevertheless, we use them as reference points in our analysis.     32
from 68.8% in quartile 1 to 0% in quartile 4. Similarly, the Elzinga-Hogarty method 
determines that 51.6% of hospitals operate in markets with an HHI of greater than 2,500 
in quartile 1, while in quartile 4 no hospitals operate in a market with an HHI of such 
magnitude.  SSNIP market definition conversely shows all but three hospitals operating 
in a market with an HHI of greater than 2,500 in quartiles 1 and 2, and just 12.5% and 
48.4% of hospitals in quartiles 3 and 4 operating below the 2,500 threshold respectively.
  
 
Elasticities    
The structural model allows for the calculation of the elasticity of demand for 
each hospital. As shown in Table 3, the average own-price elasticity of demand for a 
hospital in the sample is calculated as -4.57.  Table 6 indicates that this elasticity varies 
by density quartile, as the average elasticity of demand for hospitals increases (in 
absolute value) from 3.55 in quartile 1 to 5.48 in quartile 4. This suggests that hospitals in 
areas with more nearby competitors do in fact face stiffer competition than those with a 
lower number of nearby hospitals. While this increase in own-price elasticity using the 
structural model is notable in and of itself, as Table 5 indicates, both the Elzinga-Hogarty 
and Critical Loss methodologies produce significantly larger markets in all density 
quartiles, thus implying a much flatter demand curve for each hospital and consequently a 
larger elasticity than estimated by the structural model. 
Because the estimated consumer utility in equation (1) depends on price, all firm-
level elasticities are a function of the price parameter contained in the specified utility 
function,   . Thus, the larger elasticities produced by the two comparison methodologies 
are equivalent to consumers exhibiting more price sensitive behavior, or equivalently,   33
that the value of    in the utility function is of larger (absolute) magnitude than is 
estimated in the structural model. Thus, if we solve for this value of    that produces 
markets of equivalent size to our comparison methods, we can determine the elasticities 
that would be required in order to produce markets of equivalent size to those implied by 
Elzinga-Hogarty and Critical Loss for a 5% price increase.
40  
  In the top portion of Table 7, we include a summary by hospital density quartile 
of the average own-price elasticity in a hospital market determined by the Elzinga-
Hogarty and Critical Loss methodologies according to the structural model. For example, 
for the 93 hospital markets calculated using Elzinga-Hogarty in density quartile 1, the 
average own-price elasticity as calculated using the estimated price parameter in the 
structural model is -3.60. In the lower panel, we present the elasticities that would be 
implied by the structural model in order to make the markets determined by Elzinga-
Hogarty and Critical Loss consistent with the price elasticity assumptions of the structural 
model. For example, for the same 93 hospital markets calculated using Elzinga-Hogarty 
in density quartile 1, the value of this price parameter that would make consumers 
sufficiently price sensitive so as to produce an equivalent market to that determined by 
Elzinga-Hogarty would imply that the average own-price elasticity in these 93 markets is 
-10.10. Thus the differences in these implied elasticities demonstrate that both Elzinga-
Hogarty and Critical Loss implicitly substantially overstate the price sensitivity of 
consumers with regards to hospital care. Looking across all quartiles, Table 7 shows that 
Critical Loss overstates the magnitude of elasticities of a hospital in the median hospital 
market by a factor ranging from 2.4 in quartile 1 to 3.4 in quartile 4, while Elzinga-
                                                 
40 We solve for this value of    which equates the two markets using a binary search algorithm for each 
market.   34
Hogarty overstates these elasticities by a factor ranging from 2.3 in quartile 3 to 2.6 in 
quartile 1. 
These elasticity differences also suggest that the implied markups for hospital 
care using these informal methods are smaller than the markups that are assumed when 
analyzing actual hospital merger cases. The commonly used Lerner Index, 
    
   
 
  , 
relates elasticity to margins, implying that the determination of high margins indicates a 
low elasticity of demand. In the calculation of Critical Loss, the contribution margin 
defined in the previous section is equivalent to the left-hand side of a Lerner Index 
(assuming constant returns to scale). Thus from our elasticity estimates in Table 7, we 
can infer that the percentage markup over marginal cost implied by the Critical Loss 
market size is lower than the 55% that was actually used in our definition of the Critical 
Loss markets. As Table 7 indicates, even in the lowest hospital concentration quartile, the 
markup for a hospital in the median hospital market using the Critical Loss methodology 
is 12%, while in quartile 4, the implied markup in the market for the median hospitals is 
5.4%. Although Elzinga-Hogarty in its implementation does not explicitly postulate as to 
the implied markup, it suffers from similar shortcomings in that it suggests markups 
ranging from 7.4%-9.9% for a hospital in the median hospital market, well below those 
implied by the elasticity estimates in the structural model. Both of these findings suggest 
that the market definition techniques used in previously decided merger cases are 
inappropriate for hospital market definition; that is, using shipments based techniques 
will by and large produce overestimates of the price elasticity of demand faced by 
hospitals, thus resulting in substantially larger markets than intended in the merger 
guidelines.   35
 
An Analysis of San Diego 
  To further demonstrate market definition under the SSNIP criteria, we examine 
markets defined in a localized area of the state.  Specifically, we perform market 
definition in the San Diego area. Our selection of San Diego is strategic in that it is an 
area with few geographic barriers and it contains a reasonable number of hospitals so as 
to allow for methodological illustration while still being computationally feasible. It also 
allows us to compare the markets defined by our structural model with those delineated 
by a related, and influential, model of hospital competition developed by Capps, 
Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) and applied to proposed consolidations in New York 
State by Dranove and Sfekas (2009). 
Capps et al. (2003) present a model (based on Town and Vistnes, 2001) in which 
insurers bargain with hospitals and the market power of a hospital is based on the 
willingness to pay (WTP) of a group of consumers for the use of that particular hospital. 
This model is estimated on data from San Diego, so comparisons using this method are 
restricted to that area. 
  A summary of the San Diego area hospitals is presented in Table 8, while a map 
of the hospitals in the area is presented in Figure 2.  San Diego contains hospitals that fall 
into hospital density quartiles 2 and 3. The dominant systems in the area in our 1995 data 
are the Scripps and Sharp systems, with each controlling 6 and 5 of the 23 hospitals 
respectively. While 19 of the 23 hospitals were members of a multi-hospital system, 4 of 
these hospitals, Alvarado, Harbor View, Mission Bay and Paradise Valley were owned 
by corporations that controlled no other hospitals in the San Diego area. The other two   36
multi-hospital systems, University of California (UC) and Palomar Pomerado, each 
controlled only two hospitals. 
  Table 9 presents the results of SSNIP market definition for the San Diego area for 
each of our three market definition methodologies.  As evidenced in Table 8, San Diego 
County had a moderate degree of concentration in 1995, with a system-based HHI of 
1,949.
41 With the exception of Fallbrook Hospital, all methods produce a market which is 
a subset of the hospitals in this county.
42 Critical Loss in column one defines markets as 
consisting of 13-38 hospitals, each of which comprise substantial subsections of the San 
Diego area, and in the case of Fallbrook Hospital, portions of the Los Angeles Area. 
Similarly, Elzinga-Hogarty market definition in column two determines that markets are 
anywhere from 14-19 hospitals in size.   The structural model in column three, however, 
shows that SSNIP markets consist instead of small sets of no more than 4 hospitals, with 
a median market size of two hospitals. This difference in methodology evidently affects 
the degree of concentration implied in the San Diego area. Both of the comparison 
methods produce markets with the majority of HHIs falling in the 2,000-3,000 range, 
while no SSNIP market produced by the structural Bertrand model has a HHI lower than 
3,000 and 18 of the 23 hospitals operate in a market with an HHI of more than 5,000. 
  Figure 3 illustrates the differences in markets produced by the three 
methodologies, using as an example the definition of a market for Scripps Memorial 
Hospital - Chula Vista (Scripps Chula Vista), a 159-bed hospital located in the southern 
portion of the San Diego metropolitan area. Using the SSNIP market definition 
                                                 
41 This HHI measure takes into account system membership and is highly correlated (correlation of over .9) 
with total discharges and total patient days. 
42 In order to create a critical loss market for Fallbrook Hospital, the northernmost hospital in the sample, 
the algorithm expands into the Southern section of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area.   37
algorithm, Scripps Chula Vista and Community Hospital of Chula Vista, a 306-bed 
hospital located in the same area represent a geographic market, with a HHI of 5,500. 
Using Elzinga-Hogarty, a geographic market would include these two hospitals, as well 
as 16 other facilities in the San Diego area, producing a market with an HHI of 2,228. 
The market produced using Critical Loss shows a similar pattern, as a critical loss market 
would include a total of 17 hospitals in the San Diego metropolitan area, implying that 
Scripps Chula Vista operates in a market with an HHI of 2,692. 
 
Comparison with the Willingness to Pay Model 
The Willingness to Pay (WTP) model represents a promising method of analyzing 
mergers (Capps et al., 2003; Town and Vistnes, 2001). Because both the structural 
Bertrand model and WTP models are both rooted in a multinomial-logit demand 
specification which includes both hospital and consumer characteristics and patient-
hospital distance, we present results from a comparison of merger simulations using the 
structural Bertrand model to compare price increases implied by the WTP model (see 
Appendix A for a brief overview of the WTP model).
43  The main differences between 
the models involves the determination of firm pricing behavior; firm conduct and price 
determination are not modeled explicitly in the WTP model, rather the relationship 
between WTP and hospital profits is identified using a regression of hospital profits on 
WTP for each hospital. Mergers in the model are simulated by calculating the difference 
in WTP for a combined entity of hospitals and the sum of the WTP for each separate 
hospital in this combined entity. Using the relationship between a “unit” of WTP and 
hospital profits (calculated from the regression of hospital profits on WTP), and assuming 
                                                 
43 Details of our estimation of the WTP model are included in appendix A.   38
no change in the cost of treatment, this difference in WTP is used to show the increase in 
average revenue per patient brought about by the merger, leaving quantity unchanged.   
The WTP model does not allow for market definition in a localized area where a 
large hospital firm (system) controls multiple plants (hospitals). This is due to the 
difficulty in allocating the willingness to pay measure across hospitals of the same system 
affiliation.  Consequently, we adapt the structural Bertrand model to simulate mergers 
between individual hospitals, as well as individual hospital systems, thereby enabling 
directly comparable merger effects for each model. For our estimates of the WTP, we 
employ the same variables in our utility function as were used in Capps et al. (2003) with 
minor exceptions.
44 Furthermore, use of the WTP necessitates a different sample of 
consumers than was used in that of Capps et al. (2003) as the original estimated WTP 
utility function includes Medicare patients, indemnity patients and HMO/PPO. In order to 
ensure the most direct comparison of the two methods, we include only indemnity and 
HMO/PPO consumers.
45   
Table 10 includes the results of the mergers of 27 mergers of independent 
hospitals located in the San Diego area.
46,47  As Table 10 demonstrates, the two models 
show merger effects on price that are virtually zero for the independent San Diego 
hospitals. For the mergers in Table 10, for only one merger, that of Tri-City Hospital and 
                                                 
44 Instead of the “equipment intensity” variable, we use a “tech index” variable which is the sum over 
dummy variables for the presence of 28 technologies reported in the annual hospital financial data (such as 
presence of an MRI, open heart surgical suite, etc.).  Also, instead of travel time, we use distance. 
45 This corresponds to specification (4) in Capps et al. (2003)  
46 We display the results of independent hospitals primarily because Capps et. al. do not prescribe a method 
of calculating WTP for markets in which a hospital system controls multiple hospitals. Thus these are the 
“cleanest” comparisons of the two methodologies.  
47 We classify a hospital as independent for purposes of this analysis if the hospital had was not a member 
of a hospital system or if the hospital was owned by a corporation that controlled only one hospital in the 
San Diego area.   39
Fallbrook Hospital, do the methods differ on whether a merger would produce a SSNIP.  
They are otherwise in agreement. 
Calculation of WTP does not allow for isolation of unilateral merger effects; 
rather it determines the aggregate price increase implied by a merger in a chosen market. 
Thus we adjust the model to account for system membership; specifically we calculate 
the WTP measure for each hospital separately and given these estimates, we can then 
infer the WTP for an entire hospital system. The effect of a system merger can then be 
identified using the difference in the aggregate WTP for both systems versus the WTP for 
each system separately. Table 11 presents the results of the merger of 5 hospital systems 
in the San Diego area.  
In three of the five system mergers presented in Table 11, both models agree on 
which mergers would result in a 5% increase in price.
48 For the two mergers presented in 
Table 11 in which the two methods do not agree, both of these mergers involve the 
University of California, San Diego, a hospital which generates the largest WTP measure 
of all hospitals in our data. As Capps et al. (2003) indicate in their paper, this could be 
due to UCSD’s status as the only university hospital in the market.   This fact, coupled 
with UCSD’s service area overlap with Scripp’s Mercy Hospital (0.4 miles from UCSD) 
and Sharp Memorial Hospital (3.2 miles from UCSD) in downtown San Diego most 
likely accounts for the substantial increase in WTP (and thus price) induced by a merger 
of UCSD with both Sharp and Scripps. In the structural Bertrand model, however, UCSD 
Medical Center charges the highest price for a unit of hospital care in the San Diego 
                                                 
48 The correlation between the merger simulations and WTP model is 0.82. Furthermore, thought the 
merger simulations allow for identification of individual merger effects, in order to facilitate a direct 
comparison of the two methodologies, we weight the price increases produced by the structural Bertrand 
model’s merger simulations by the demand at each hospital (pre-merger).    40
($5,827)  area while also exhibiting the highest own-price elasticity (-5.99) of San Diego 
area hospitals (with the exception of Villa View Hospital). This pattern is suggestive of 
the UCSD Medical Center exerting market power in its pricing of hospital services. 
Consequently, while a merger of UCSD with hospital systems in the area does produce 
an increase in price using the structural Bertrand model, this increase is most likely not as 
large as would be the case if UCSD were not already exerting market power. To the 
degree that consumers and health insurers substitute to other health care providers as a 
result of the prevailing high price at UCSD Medical Center, the observed elasticity may 
account for the lower price increase implied by the merger of these systems in the 
structural Bertrand model.  
  Overall, the results of the comparisons between these two methods reveal a 
notable degree of similarity for hospital merger effects in the San Diego area. Though the 
models differ in their assumptions about firm conduct, given that both models identify 
demand-side merger effects via the intersection of patient market shares, such a result is 
not surprising.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
  Market definition is essential for merger analysis, and has played a pivotal role for 
antitrust decisions in the hospital industry in the past two decades. The vast majority of 
hospital merger cases have utilized ad hoc methods of geographic market definition that 
rely heavily upon patient shipment data, with no explicit economic model used to justify 
such methods. Our use of a fully specified structural model of hospital competition 
compares commonly employed geographic market definition approaches used in actual   41
hospital merger cases to geographic markets rooted in the principles set forth by the 
merger guidelines. This method explicitly models consumer and producer behavior, and 
also accounts for firms operating at multiple locations, as required by the 2010 merger 
guidelines. 
We find that the use of approaches frequently utilized in previous cases largely 
overstate the size of geographic markets for hospitals, particularly in areas with greater 
hospital density. In addition, these informal approaches imply elasticities ranging from 
2.4-3.4 times as large as those calculated from a structural model of hospital competition. 
Furthermore, our analysis of the San Diego area is consistent with those implied by the 
model of Capps et al. (2003). 
The results have important implications for merger analysis in both the hospital 
industry and other industries involving differentiated products. They illustrate the 
importance of economic modeling for defining markets, and indicate that reliance on 
imprecise methods of market definition has the potential to mislead the courts as to the 
appropriate extent of geographic markets.  The markets presented here are most 
consistent with those identified in merger cases by plaintiffs rather than by defendants, in 
contrast to the court’s frequent rejection of markets alleged by the antitrust authorities. 
Thus the use of such an approach should be emphasized when assessing the extent of 
market power in this and other differentiated product industries. 
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Appendix A: The Capps, Dranove and Sattherwaite Model of Option Demand 
 
A.1 Consumers 
Consumers are assumed to maximize ex post expected utility. Thus they maximize the 
expected utility of obtaining treatment for a specific condition at a specific hospital, but 
before treatment is actually obtained.  The utility function is defined as  
ij j i i i i ij j j ij p Z Y Z Y T S R U U ε γ + − = ) , ( ) , , , , (  
where  j R  is a vector of hospital characteristics that are common across all patient 
conditions,  j S  is a vector of variables that contain patient specific service offerings,  ij T  
is the travel time from patient i to hospital j,  i Y  is a vector of the patient’s socioeconomic 
characteristics, and  i Z is a vector of clinical attributes specific to patient i. Assuming that 
) , ( i i Z Y γ is constant, individual i will select hospital j if for all hospitals j≠k,  
ij ik i i ik k k i i ij j j Z Y T S R U Z Y T S R U ε ε − > − ) , , , , ( ) , , , , ( . 
Assuming ε is distributed i.i.d. extreme value, the probability  ij s  that patient i chooses 
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 where G is a network of hospitals 
from which the patient chooses. The the parameter estimates for our calculation of the 
utility function are included in Table A.1. 
 
The patient’s interim expected utility is thus 
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where  i λ is the location of consumer i. Capps et al. then define the ex-ante willingness to 
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. Because this willingness to pay 
is identified only up to the scale factor ) , ( i i Z Y γ , summing over all consumers the 
willingness to pay for hospital j is thus written as  
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A.2 Pricing 
  After the willingness to pay measure is calculated for hospitals, Capps et al. 
regress hospital profits on the willingness to pay measure (without a constant) and 
recover the coefficient from this regression, a ˆ. This generates the predicted impact of 
WTP on hospital profits. Using the average revenue and average cost per discharge at a 
hospital, they then calculate a measure of profits per discharge at each hospital.  
 
 
A.3 Merger Effects using WTP 
  The first step in using WTP to simulate merger effects entails calculating the 
difference in willingness to pay for a merged entity versus the willingness to pay for each 
entity independently. Defining  
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the increase in WTP as a result of a merger would thus be  
 






k j Δ − Δ − Δ + . 
As Capps et al. detail in their paper, if two hospitals are far enough apart, then if hospital 
j has a positive market share in market segment  ) , , ( i i i Y Z λ , hospital k will likely have a   49
zero market share in that same segment. Thus the expression 






k j Δ − Δ − Δ + will be zero and thus a merger of hospitals j and k will 
likely generate no increase in the market power of the two firms.  
  The second step in using WTP to simulate merger effects involves inferring the 
increase in profits resulting from a merger of two firms. Capps et. al. do this by 
calculating the increase in profits to the entity (j+k),  k j+ Δπ ˆ , as 






k j k j Δ − Δ − Δ = Δ + + π  
Profits are then calculated for the merged entity as  k j k j + Δ + + π π π ˆ . Price increases are 
then inferred as the price changes implied by the changes in profits, assuming quantity 
does not change. 
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Appendix B: Definition of a SSNIP Market 
 
SSNIP Definition 
Formally, given demand for each hospital as a function of its price, the SSNIP market 
for a hospital is defined as follows: 
A SSNIP market for hospital j, is the set of hospitals, M, (of which hospital j is a 
member), such that given a vector of pre-SSNIP prices p and post-SSNIP prices p’     
1)  ∑ > −
s
s s p p 0 ) ( ) ' ( π π for hospital systems with at least one plant in M and 
2) M is the smallest set of hospitals such that (1) holds 
where  k k p p * ) 05 . 1 (












 Table A.1 WTP Parameter Estimates
Conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression
Number of obs = 1381200
LR chi2(68)     =  126728.31
Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Log likelihood = -119532.84 Pseudo R2 =0.3464
Coef. std. error z P>|z|
fp -0.546 0.109 -5.030 0.000 -0.759 -0.334
teach 0.984 0.069 14.210 0.000 0.848 1.119
transplant 0.372 0.015 25.150 0.000 0.343 0.401
nurs_int -0.187 0.011 -16.620 0.000 -0.209 -0.165
tech_ind 0.104 0.006 18.710 0.000 0.093 0.115
distance -0.275 0.004 -64.550 0.000 -0.283 -0.266
distXfp 0.013 0.001 13.270 0.000 0.011 0.014
distXteach 0.010 0.001 18.460 0.000 0.009 0.011
distXnurs 0.001 0.000 3.710 0.000 0.000 0.001
distXtech 0.001 0.000 10.330 0.000 0.001 0.001
distXmale 0.008 0.002 5.120 0.000 0.005 0.011
distXelderly -0.043 0.002 -23.810 0.000 -0.046 -0.039
distXwhite 0.029 0.003 8.490 0.000 0.022 0.036
distXincome 0.000 0.000 -3.060 0.002 0.000 0.000
distXlengstay 0.000 0.000 3.260 0.001 0.000 0.000
distXpctravl 0.264 0.008 34.240 0.000 0.249 0.279
distXotherproc 0.005 0.001 7.750 0.000 0.004 0.007
distXotherdiag -0.008 0.001 -13.900 0.000 -0.009 -0.007
maleXfp -0.159 0.046 -3.490 0.000 -0.248 -0.070
maleXteach -0.163 0.028 -5.880 0.000 -0.217 -0.109
maleXnursint 0.035 0.005 7.510 0.000 0.026 0.044
maleXtech -0.002 0.002 -0.920 0.357 -0.007 0.002
eldXfp -0.021 0.051 -0.420 0.677 -0.121 0.079
eldXteach -0.696 0.031 -22.300 0.000 -0.757 -0.635
eldXnurs_int 0.083 0.005 15.590 0.000 0.073 0.093
eldXtech -0.041 0.003 -15.120 0.000 -0.046 -0.035
whiteXfp 0.066 0.084 0.790 0.431 -0.099 0.231
whiteXteach 0.670 0.059 11.320 0.000 0.554 0.786
whiteXnursint -0.105 0.009 -11.440 0.000 -0.124 -0.087
whiteXtech -0.007 0.005 -1.470 0.142 -0.016 0.002
incomXfp 0.000 0.000 -6.050 0.000 0.000 0.000
incomXteach 0.000 0.000 -16.680 0.000 0.000 0.000
incomXnursint 0.000 0.000 7.410 0.000 0.000 0.000
incomXtech 0.000 0.000 14.350 0.000 0.000 0.000
lengsXfp -0.059 0.004 -13.590 0.000 -0.067 -0.050
lengsXteach -0.019 0.002 -9.150 0.000 -0.024 -0.015
lengsXnursint -0.003 0.000 -10.030 0.000 -0.003 -0.002
lengsXtech 0.000 0.000 -1.110 0.267 0.000 0.000
pctraXfp 0.659 0.203 3.250 0.001 0.261 1.057
pctraXteach -0.452 0.129 -3.500 0.000 -0.704 -0.199
pctraXnursint 0.476 0.024 19.800 0.000 0.429 0.523
pctraXtech 0.046 0.011 3.990 0.000 0.023 0.068
other_prXfp -0.030 0.018 -1.610 0.107 -0.066 0.006
other_prXteach -0.017 0.012 -1.400 0.160 -0.040 0.007
[95% Conf. Interval]other_prXnursint 0.018 0.002 9.070 0.000 0.014 0.022
other_prtech -0.003 0.001 -2.720 0.006 -0.005 -0.001
other_diXfp 0.292 0.019 15.580 0.000 0.255 0.328
other_diteach -0.105 0.011 -9.950 0.000 -0.126 -0.084
other_diXnursint 0.020 0.002 11.040 0.000 0.016 0.023
other_diXtech -0.007 0.001 -7.690 0.000 -0.009 -0.005
match_nerv 0.510 0.085 5.970 0.000 0.343 0.677
match_resp 0.221 0.144 1.540 0.124 -0.061 0.503
match_card 0.702 0.030 23.070 0.000 0.642 0.761
match_obst 2.157 0.061 35.420 0.000 2.037 2.276
match_imag 1.273 0.289 4.400 0.000 0.705 1.840
distXdiag_endo -0.019 0.009 -2.000 0.045 -0.037 0.000
distXdiag_otol -0.011 0.009 -1.280 0.202 -0.028 0.006
distXdiag_resp 0.053 0.006 9.610 0.000 0.042 0.064
distXdiag_card 0.045 0.003 15.140 0.000 0.039 0.051
distXdiag_lymp 0.028 0.009 3.280 0.001 0.011 0.045
distXdiag_diges 0.000 0.003 0.120 0.908 -0.006 0.007
distXdiag_urin 0.005 0.005 1.120 0.263 -0.004 0.015
distXdiag_geni 0.002 0.002 0.850 0.394 -0.003 0.007
distXdiag_obst 0.049 0.002 19.860 0.000 0.044 0.054
distXdiag_musc 0.016 0.003 5.860 0.000 0.010 0.021
distXdiag_inte 0.006 0.005 1.260 0.207 -0.003 0.015
distXdiag_imag 0.050 0.006 8.440 0.000 0.038 0.061
distXdiag_nerv 0.029 0.004 6.370 0.000 0.020 0.037Table 1: Case Summary 1994-2005
Year Case Winner Primary Reason for Decision Market Size Government's Alleged Pre-Merger Market Concentration
2005 Evanston Northwestern Health Care
FTC
Merger substantially lessened 
competition
          Government: 3 hospitals
          Defendant: 9 hospitals
10,000
1999 Sutter
(California ex rel. Lockyer v. Sutter 
Health Sys.)
Hospitals
Insufficient evidence of a 
relevant geographic market
          Government: 10 hospitals
          Defendant: 29 hospitals
1998 Poplar Bluff (Circuit)
(FTC v. Tenet Healthcare)
Hospitals
FTC failed to identify a 
relevant geographic market
          Government: 7 hospitals
          Defendant: 22 hospitals
2,800-4,300
1999 Poplar Bluff (District)
(FTC v. Tenet Healthcare) FTC
FTC's prliminary injunction 
request was granted but later 
reversed (see above)
See above See above
1997 Long Island
(U.S. v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr.) Hospitals
DOJ failed to identify relevant 
product and geographic market
          Government: 5-mile radius
          Defendant: Nassau, Queens, 
          Western Suffolk and Manhattan
(no pre-merger info but allegations that the merging hospitals 
would have 100% of the market post-merger)
1996 Grand Rapids
(FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp)
Hospitals Not-for-profit merger           Government: 9 hospitals
         Defendant: 9 hospitals
Approx. 1,600-1,700
1995 Dubuque
(United States v. Mercy Health Servs.) Hospitals
DOJ failed to identify relevant 
product and geographic market
          Government: 3 hospitals
          Defendant: 19 hospitals
1995 Joplin
(FTC v. Freeman Hosp.)
Hospitals
FTC failed to identify a 
relevant geographic market
          Government: 5 hospitals
         Defendant: 17 hospitals
1,402
1994 Ukiah
(Adventist Health Sys./West) Hospitals
FTC failed to identify a 
relevant geographic market
          Government: 5 hospitals
          Defendant: 16 hospitals
4,600 (3,196 on appeal)Table 2: Geographic Market Definition Methodologies in Merger Cases (1994-2005)
Year Case Winner Primary Method Used for Geographic Market definition
2005 Evanston Northwestern Health Care
FTC
          Government: Managed care testimony, 
          post-merger price increases
          Defendant: Patient flow analysis (similar to Elzinga-Hogarty), 
          travel time, physician admitting practices
1999 Sutter
(California ex rel. Lockyer v. Sutter  Hospitals
          Government: Elzinga-Hogarty and Critical Loss
          Defendant: Critical Loss (and "direct competitor test")
1998 Poplar Bluff (Circuit)
(FTC v. Tenet Healthcare)
Hospitals
          Government: Elzinga-Hogarty
          Defendant: Critical Loss
1999 Poplar Bluff (District)
(FTC v. Tenet Healthcare)
FTC See above
1997 Long Island
(U.S. v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr.) Hospitals
          Government: Testimony of managed care witnesses
          Defendant: Patient Origin data
1996 Grand Rapids
(FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp)
Hospitals
          Government: Elzinga-Hogarty
          Defendant: Elzinga-Hogarty
1995 Dubuque
(United States v Mercy Health Servs ) Hospitals
          Government: Elzinga-Hogarty
Defendant: Critical Loss (United States v. Mercy Health Servs.) osp s
         Defendant: Critical Loss
1995 Joplin
(FTC v. Freeman Hosp.)
Hospitals
          Government: Elzinga-Hogarty




          Government: Elzinga-Hogarty
          Defendant: Elzinga-HogartyTable 3 Summary Data for the Structural Model





Distance to chosen hospital 11.60
Hospital Characteristics (N=368)
Price 4681








Cross-Price Elasticity w/rspt to closest hospital 0.60
Cross-Price Elasticity w/rspt to 2nd closest hospital 0.40
Cross-Price Elasticity w/rspt to 3rd closest hospital 0.30
Cross-Price Elasticity w/rspt to 4th closest hospital 0.21
Cross-Price Elasticity w/rspt to 5th closest hospital 0.19Table 4
(N=368)
Critical Loss Elzinga-Hogarty SSNIP Mkt. Def. HSA MSA/PMSA*
Number of Hospitals in a Market
Mean 26.75 22.43 3.78 54.38 41.83
std. dev 25.63 20.54 2.06 56.18 40.62
Median 16 13 3 16 18
Max 89 78 14 130 100
Min 21 2 1 2
Hospital HHIs (beds)
Mean 1505 1460 3874 1031 1005
std. dev 1511 1392 1418 1377 1070
Median 875 1026 3683 832 714
Max 6914 10000 8911 10000 5947
Min 183 211 1054 118 158
Hospital System HHIs (beds)
Mean 1891 1899 3989 1386 1398
std. dev 1716 1577 1442 1500 1260
Median 1194 1499 3814 1191 1191
Max 10000 10000 8911 10000 10000
Min 356 439 1244 327 366
* The number of MSAs in California is 24. The number of hospitals in the sample that are located in a MSA is 312.
Method of Market DefinitionTable 5 (N=93) (N=96) (N=88) (N=91)
Critical Loss Elzinga-Hogarty SSNIP Mkt. Def. Critical Loss Elzinga-Hogarty SSNIP Mkt. Def. Critical Loss Elzinga-Hogarty SSNIP Mkt. Def. Critical Loss Elzinga-Hogarty SSNIP Mkt. Def.
Number of Hospitals in a Market
Mean 5.80 7.19 2.78 10.79 9.51 2.80 26.27 23.73 3.64 65.47 50.37 5.96
std. dev 5.51 4.69 1.24 9.19 5.55 1.17 11.77 15.30 1.30 13.50 15.18 2.42
Median 4 6 2 8 8 2 24 18 4 67 50 5
Max 46 22 10 48 26 7 76 73 7 89 78 14
Min 2 1 2 2 1 2 11 7 2 28 9 2
Unique Markets 68 57 73 65 49 73 68 43 72 86 30 79
Difference in Market Size from SSNIP Market Def.
Mean 3.01 4.41 - 7.99 6.71 - 22.64 20.09 - 59.52 44.42 -
std. dev 4.98 4.94 - 9.17 5.60 - 11.58 15.15 - 12.96 15.17 -
Median 1 3 - 5 5 - 20 16 - 62 44 -
Max 36 20 - 45 23 - 72 68 - 85 73 -
Min -3 -3 - -2 -1 - 8 3 - 22 2 -
Hospital System HHIs (beds)
Mean 3471 3161 4694 2460 2510 4823 1065 1250 3820 474 592 2552
std. dev 1719 1920 1053 1636 1270 1198 750 683 1441 61 205 675
Median 3448 2611 5047 2243 2290 5045 770 1134 3372 468 545 2538
Max 10000 10000 7381 10000 10000 8911 2769 2960 8362 695 1367 5006
Min 524 745 1452 392 721 2450 356 439 1814 380 442 1244
Hospitals Operating within Guideline Thresholds
Premerger HHI <1500 8 15 1 24 18 0 72 61 0 91 91 4
1500   Premerger HHI   2500 15 30 1 39 40 1 6 24 11 0 0 40
2500<Premerger HHI  64 48 91 33 38 95 10 3 77 0 0 47
Number of Hospitals within 25 miles
Mean 2.40 10.71 36.15 93.10
std. dev. 1.61 3.54 16.60 9.93
Quartile 4 
(71-110 hospitals)
Market size by quartile of the number of hospitals 







Own Elasticity by Hospital Concentration Quartile Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Mean -3.55 -4.24 -5.05 -5.48
std. dev 1.51 1.78 1.55 1.66
Median -3.27 -3.88 -4.90 -5.27
Max -1.01 -1.75 -1.67 -2.15
Min -8.87 -11.55 -11.33 -10.36
Own Price ElasticityTable 7 Elasticity by Hospital Density Quartile
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Average Estimated Structural Elasticity in Critical Loss Market
Mean -3.60 -4.39 -5.20 -5.48
std. dev 0.72 0.89 0.54 0.12
Median -3.51 -4.29 -5.39 -5.47
Max -2.17 -2.74 -4.10 -5.09
Min -6.35 -8.55 -5.84 -5.84
Average Estimated Structural Elasticity in Elzinga-Hogarty Market
Mean -3.89 -4.26 -5.28 -5.41
std. dev 0.91 0.69 0.65 0.14
Median -3.72 -4.20 -5.39 -5.43
Max -1.01 -3.22 -4.14 -4.92
Min -6.81 -5.99 -6.25 -5.63
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Average Implied Structural Elasticity in a Critical Loss Market
Mean -10.10 -13.84 -17.27 -18.65
std. dev 7.02 6.86 6.31 3.58
Median -8.57 -12.54 -15.36 -18.53
Max -2.27 -2.74 -7.76 -10.51
Min -30.35 -48.13 -36.54 -29.02
Average Implied Structural Elasticity in an Elzinga-Hogarty Market
Mean -12.55 -13.32 -14.57 -13.10
std. dev 9.41 6.80 8.04 2.37
Median -10.15 -10.97 -12.16 -13.60
Max -1.01 -3.23 -6.80 -5.96
Min -37.40 -34.81 -32.85 -15.47Table 8  San Diego Hospitals
Hospital Ownership Teach Control Tech Index Beds Price Demand Own Price Elasticity # Hosps. Within 25 Miles
ALVARADO HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER Tenet N FP 14 240 3979 2213 -4.48 20
SCRIPPS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL - CHULA VISTA Scripps N NFP 8 159 3931 1335 -4.23 17
HARBOR VIEW HEALTH PARTNERS Ornda N FP 14 156 3025 1479 -3.50 19
THE CORONADO HOSPITAL Sharp N NFP 19 204 4007 562 -4.63 19
SHARP CABRILLO HOSPITAL Sharp N NFP 17 227 2535 920 -2.96 19
SHARP MEMORIAL HOSPITAL Sharp Y NFP 22 642 4238 15749 -3.92 20
SCRIPPS HOSPITAL EAST COUNTY Scripps N NFP 14 162 3440 485 -3.93 19
FALLBROOK HOSPITAL DISTRICT N Munic 9 149 4133 665 -3.92 7
GROSSMONT HOSPITAL CORPORATION Sharp Y NFP 24 422 3425 9392 -3.29 20
MERCY HOSPITAL Scripps Y NFP 16 416 4282 8242 -4.30 19
MISSION BAY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL Columbia N FP 18 128 2219 613 -2.66 20
PALOMAR POMERADO HEALTH SYSTEM (Escondido) Palomar N Munic 21 389 3874 5247 -3.30 12
PARADISE VALLEY HOSPITAL Adventist N NFP 15 228 3035 703 -3.55 18
SCRIPPS HEALTH - LA JOLLA Scripps N NFP 27 454 4211 10376 -3.98 21
TRI-CITY HOSPITAL DISTRICT N Munic 24 333 2865 5242 -2.10 7
UCSD MEDICAL CENTER UC Y NFP 23 359 5827 4193 -5.99 19
VILLA VIEW COMMUNITY HOSPITAL N NFP 11 102 5368 26 -6.18 19
COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF CHULA VISTA Sharp N NFP 15 306 4383 2557 -4.15 17
PALOMAR POMERADO HEALTH SYSTEM (Poway) Palomar N Munic 20 250 4572 2819 -4.70 19
GREEN HOSPITAL OF SCRIPPS CLINIC Scripps Y NFP 24 173 2357 5202 -2.62 21
SCRIPPS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL - ENCINITAS Scripps N NFP 16 145 4560 2219 -4.74 18
SAN DIEGO HOSPICE CORPORATION N NFP 0 24 3741 55 -4.33 19
UCSD LA JOLLA, THORNTON HOSPITAL UC N NFP 13 62 4523 1265 -5.02 21Table 9
Market Definition for San Diego
No. of Hospitals HHI No. of Hospitals HHI No. of Hospitals HHI
ALVARADO HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER 16 2769 14 2960 3 4216
SCRIPPS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL - CHULA VISTA 17 2692 18 2228 2 5500
HARBOR VIEW HEALTH PARTNERS 16 2696 18 2228 4 3584
THE CORONADO HOSPITAL 16 2696 18 2228 2 5089
SHARP CABRILLO HOSPITAL 17 2692 19 2454 2 5254
SHARP MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 18 2709 19 2454 2 5400
SCRIPPS HOSPITAL EAST COUNTY 17 2500 15 2861 2 5991
FALLBROOK HOSPITAL DISTRICT 38 775 14 2242 3 4306
GROSSMONT HOSPITAL CORPORATION 16 2769 14 2960 2 5378
MERCY HOSPITAL 17 2692 18 2228 2 5027
MISSION BAY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 17 2239 19 2454 4 6914
PALOMAR POMERADO HEALTH SYSTEM (Escondido) 13 2083 14 2200 3 5496
PARADISE VALLEY HOSPITAL 17 2692 18 2228 2 5159
SCRIPPS HEALTH - LA JOLLA 16 2464 19 2454 3 8362
TRI-CITY HOSPITAL DISTRICT 19 1873 14 2033 2 5773
UCSD MEDICAL CENTER 17 2692 18 2228 2 5027
VILLA VIEW COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 16 2769 18 2228 4 3029
COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF CHULA VISTA 17 2692 18 2228 2 5500
PALOMAR POMERADO HEALTH SYSTEM (Poway) 14 2302 18 2228 3 5143
GREEN HOSPITAL OF SCRIPPS CLINIC 16 2464 19 2454 3 8362
SCRIPPS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL - ENCINITAS 15 1825 16 2064 3 5003
SAN DIEGO HOSPICE CORPORATION 16 2696 18 2228 3 4739
UCSD LA JOLLA, THORNTON HOSPITAL 16 2464 19 2454 2 7886
Critical Loss Market Elzinga-Hogarty SSNIP Mkt. Def.Table 10: Price Increases for Mergers of Independent San Diego Hospitals
Merger (distance between hospitals in parenthesis) Price increase Merger  (distance between hospitals in parenthesis) Price increase
Mission bay & Alvarado (9.36 miles) Alvarado & Fallbrook (43.09 miles)
Structural Bertrand Model 0.28% Structural Bertrand Model 0.02%
WTP Model 0.41% WTP Model 0.03%
Mission bay & Paradise Valley (11.14 miles) Alvarado & Tri-City (31.36 miles)
Structural Bertrand Model 0.14% Structural Bertrand Model 0.14%
WTP Model 1.06% WTP Model 0.22%
Mission bay & Harborview (6.27 miles) Alvarado & Villa View (2.32 miles)
Structural Bertrand Model 0.39% Structural Bertrand Model 0.04%
WTP Model 0.83% WTP Model 0.34%
Alvarado & Paradise Valley (6.4 miles) Alvarado & San Diego Hospice (6.62 miles)
Structural Bertrand Model 0.43% Structural Bertrand Model 0.05%
WTP Model 0.48% WTP Model 0.12%
Alvarado & Harborview (7.22 miles) Paradise Valley & Fallbrook (48.82 miles)
Structural Bertrand Model 0.61% Structural Bertrand Model 0.00%
WTP Model 0.23% WTP Model 0.03%
Paradise Valley & Harborview (5.36 miles) Paradise Valley & Tri-City (36.51 miles)
Structural Bertrand Model 0.46% Structural Bertrand Model 0.03%
WTP Model 0.67% WTP Model 0.15%
Mission Bay and Fallbrook (39.84 miles) Paradise Valley & Villa View (4.23 miles)
Structural Bertrand Model 0.00% Structural Bertrand Model 0.00%
WTP Model 0.24% WTP Model 1.62%
Mission Bay and Tri-City (26.68 miles) Paradise Valley & San Diego Hospice (6.01 miles)
Structural Bertrand Model 0.11% Structural Bertrand Model 0.04%
WTP Model 0.75% WTP Model 0.55%
Mission Bay and Villa View (8.9 miles) Harborview and Fallbrook (45.58 miles)
Structural Bertrand Model 0.00% Structural Bertrand Model 0.01%
WTP Model 1.91% WTP Model 0.03%
Mission Bay and San Diego Hospice (5.24 miles) Harborview and Tri-City (32.70 miles)
Structural Bertrand Model 0.01% Structural Bertrand Model 0.08%
WTP Model 1.46% WTP Model 0.14%
Fallbrook & Tri-City (13.85 miles) Harborview and Villa View (5.32 miles)
Structural Bertrand Model 1.57% Structural Bertrand Model 0.01%
WTP Model 5.30% WTP Model 0.74%
Fallbrook & Villa View (44.85 miles) Harborview and San Diego Hospice (1.25 miles)
Structural Bertrand Model 0.00% Structural Bertrand Model 0.05%
WTP Model 0.10% WTP Model 0.30%
Villa View & Tri-City (32.71 miles) Tri-City & San Diego Hospice (31.5 miles)
Structural Bertrand Model 0.00% Structural Bertrand Model 0.00%
WTP Model 0.11% WTP Model 0.05%
Villa View & San Diego Hospice (5.02 miles)
Structural Bertrand Model 0.00%
WTP Model 2.28%Table 11: Price Increases for Mergers of San Diego Hospital Systems
System Merger Price increase
Scripps and Sharp
Structural Bertrand Model 16.11%
WTP Model 17.48%
Scripps and UCSD
Structural Bertrand Model 3.48%
WTP Model 8.37%
Sharp and UCSD
Structural Bertrand Model 3.70%
WTP Model 13.31%
Palomar Pomerado and Scripps 
Structural Bertrand Model 5.40%
WTP Model 8.46%
Palomar Pomerado and Tri-City
Structural Bertrand Model 6.18%
WTP Model 9.43%Quartile 1 Quartile 2

























































Market Defintion for Scripps Chula Vista: 































Market Defintion for Scripps Chula Vista: 
SSNIP Market Definition vs Elzinga-Hogarty
Elzinga-Hogarty
SSNIP Market 
Definition
SHARP CABRILLO
Elzinga-Hogarty:
18 hospitals
HHI=2,228
SSNIP Mkt. Def.:
2 hospitals
HHI=5,500
SSNIP Mkt. Def.:
2 hospitals
HHI=5,500
Critical Loss:
17 hospitals
HHI=2,692
Figure 3